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1 Introduction
A central problem in the empirical analysis of strategic settings is the presence of incomplete
information. For example, in an auction, it matters not only what bidders believe about
their value from the object if they win it, but also what they believe about others’ beliefs
about the value of the object to them and to others. In making predictions about outcomes
in a counterfactual strategic environment, it is standard and natural to hold the information
structure fixed. Because information structures are complex, most applied work relies on
strong assumptions about the information structure (such as independent private values in
an auction). But the strength of these assumptions undermines the credibility of the resulting
counterfactual predictions.
In this paper, we provide a novel approach to counterfactual analysis with latent and fixed
information. We describe a completely non-parametric approach to identifying counterfac-
tuals by treating the information structure as a nuisance parameter—that is, a parameter
which is not of intrinsic interest but needs to be accounted for in making counterfactual
predictions. We thus avoid the complexity that would be involved in identifying the infor-
mation structure.1 By focusing on a given counterfactual of interest and finite-dimensional
restrictions on information implicit in observed behavior, we are able to derive a concise
description of the set of counterfactual predictions.
Let us describe our approach in a simple case. Suppose that an individual takes an action
a from a finite set of possible actions. The action results in a payoff u (a, θ), where θ is an
uncertain state of the world that has finitely many possible values. Suppose that we observe
the empirical distribution of (a, θ), which we refer to as the outcome and denote by φ(a, θ).
We do not observe the individual’s information about θ, but we maintain the standard
assumption that the action maximizes expected utility, given whatever beliefs about θ are
held at the time the decision was made.
1In an earlier version of this paper (Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris, 2020), we discuss in greater detail
the conceptual difficulties associated with identifying the information structure. At the very least, we would
need to identify a distribution over the players’ infinite sequences of higher-order beliefs.
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Now suppose we wish to predict how the same representative individual will behave in
a new decision problem, where an action â leads to a payoff û (â, θ). Importantly, while
the decision problem changes, the distribution of θ and the information are assumed to
remain the same. The former can be computed directly from φ, but the latter is a latent
parameter. Our question is: which counterfactual outcomes φ̂ (â, θ) could be induced by
optimal behavior for some information structure which also rationalizes the observed data
φ?
Our main result implies the following simple and tractable characterization of these pre-
dictions: Imagine that rather than performing an abstract thought experiment, the individual
actually did choose â at the same time as a was chosen, and we simply did not observe it.
The payoff was simply the sum of the payoffs across the two decision problems, so that there
was no interaction between the two choices except through the common information. We
refer to this as the linked decision problem, in which the action is an ordered pair (a, â).
Since both actions were taken based on the same information about the same state, there
will be correlation between θ, a, and â, and we can write φ (a, â, θ) for the joint distribution
of these objects. For φ to be consistent with our data, the marginal on (a, θ) must be φ. The
counterfactual prediction is simply the marginal of φ on (â, θ). The linked decision problem
therefore induces conditions on the marginal distributions and on the joint distribution of
(a, â, θ).
Thus, the problem of computing counterfactual predictions can be reduced to computing
those outcomes φ for the linked problem which are consistent with Bayesian rationality.
But Bergemann and Morris (2013, 2016) have shown that these are precisely the Bayes
correlated equilibria (BCE) of the linked problem, which are a convex set of φ that satisfy
a finite collection of “obedience constraints” that encode Bayesian optimality. When we add
in the constraint that the marginal on (a, θ) is the observed φ, we obtain a convex set of
joint distributions φ on (a, â, θ) which are consistent with rationality in the linked decision
problem and are consistent with the data. The marginals of these distributions on (â, θ) is
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precisely the set of counterfactual outcomes that are consistent with the data. When there
are finitely many actions and states and the data is given by finitely many linear constraints,
counterfactual predictions are defined by a finitely many linear inequalities, which one can
use, e.g., to compute the range of counterfactual welfare via linear programming.
This outline presumes there is one player and that the entire outcome is observed. Our
subsequent analysis shows that this logic goes through in general many-player finite-action
games, where the data reveals linear constraints on φ. For example, it might be that we only
observe the distribution of actions or some statistic of players’ actions, such as the winning
bid in an auction. The argument that counterfactual predictions are characterized by linear
inequalities is completely general, and follows the same steps as our informal discussion
above.
We present two examples that illustrate our characterization and show how features of
the information structure are encoded in the data. The first is a discrete version of Roy’s
(1951) model of self selection: a worker decides whether or not to join the workforce (the
action) in the presence of uncertainty about potential earnings (the state). We first consider
both the case where the entire outcome is observed, so that we see potential earnings for
all workers, and also the case where the data is censored and potential earnings are only
observed conditional on employment. The example shows how the observed correlation
between employment and wages restricts the worker’s information, which in turn determines
counterfactual welfare when the potential earnings rise or fall. The second example is a two-
firm entry game in the spirit of Ciliberto and Tamer (2009). The novelty in this strategic
setting is that the observed outcome restricts both what the each firm knows about the state,
and also what they know about the other firm’s information.
Following the examples, we discuss some straightforward extensions that are likely to be
important for applications. Our main result is presented in a stark theoretical benchmark
where the analyst knows nothing about players’ information ex ante. There are many natural
settings where an analyst would know more than in our baseline model but less than in
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standard parameterized models of the information structure. In Section 5, we show how
assumptions about the information structure can be incorporated in order to tighten the set
of counterfactual predictions. For example, the analyst might be confident that players know
those features of the state that affect their own preferences, which we refer to as the case of
private values; or the analyst may observe “payoff shifters” that affect a player’s preferences
but are orthogonal to other elements of the model.
As noted above, our approach builds on the work of Bergemann and Morris (2013, 2016)
who showed that BCE are precisely the outcomes that can arise under some information
structure and equilibrium, for a fixed game. The contribution of this paper is to introduce
linked games to characterize counterfactual predictions when information is the same in
the observed and counterfactual games. A different approach to counterfactuals building
on BCE results is to impose no restriction on how information might vary between the
observations and counterfactual. This “unrestricted-information” approach was discussed
informally in Bergemann and Morris (2013) and Bergemann et al. (2017) and implemented
by Magnolfi and Roncoroni (2021) and Syrgkanis et al. (2021).2 We discuss this and other
ways of relaxing the fixed-information assumption in Section 5 and discuss these and other
econometric papers in Section 6.
Before proving our main result, we derive a foundational result on joint predictions across
games when there is a common information structure, in terms of BCE of a linked game.
Our result on counterfactuals follows when we consider two games, and identify one with
the observed data and the other with the counterfactual. The joint predictions result has
potential applications beyond counterfactuals. In Section 7, we argue that it can be used to
derive “informationally robust” rankings of games, which are illustrated in the Supplemental
Appendix. Heumann (2019) analyzed a version of this problem in the context of symmetric
games with normal uncertainty and linear best responses. The methods and results are com-
2In recent versions of their work, Magnolfi and Roncoroni (2021) study fixed-information counterfactuals
as well as unrestricted-information counterfactuals
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plementary. Our approach is more general, which expands the range of potential applications
but may make it harder to obtain analytic results.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 establishes the basic notation.
Section 3 presents our main results on counterfactual predictions. Section 4 presents our
examples. Section 5 presents extensions. Section 6 discusses related literature. Section 7
concludes the paper. A Supplemental Appendix contains additional results and examples.
2 Preliminaries
There is a state of the world θ ∈ Θ, where Θ is finite. There is also a set of players, indexed
by i = 1, . . . , N . The players and state space will be held fixed throughout our analysis.
The players interact through a base game G = (Ai, ui)Ni=1, where Ai is the set of actions
of player i, A = ×Ni=1Ai is the set of action profiles, and ui : A×Θ→ R represents player i’s
expected utility preferences over (a, θ).







where Si is a measurable set of signals of player i, S = ×Ni=1Si is the set of signal profiles,
and π : Θ→ ∆ (S) describes the joint distribution of signals conditional on the state.3
The prior distribution over states is denoted µ ∈ ∆ (Θ).
A (Bayesian) game is a tuple (µ,G, I). A strategy for player i in the game is a measurable
mapping σi : Si → ∆ (Ai). We write σi (ai|si) for the probability of an action ai given
the signal si. A strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σN) is associated with the product mapping








ui (a, θ)σ (a|s)π (ds|θ)µ (θ) .
The profile σ is a (Nash) equilibrium if Ui (σ) ≥ Ui (σ′i, σ−i) for all i and for all strategies σ′i.
3Note that we allow the information structure to be infinite, while the other objects in the model are finite.
This richness is necessary to accommodate the full range of possible higher order beliefs and correspondingly
the full range of equilibrium behavior across all counterfactuals.
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An outcome of G is a distribution φ ∈ ∆ (A×Θ). Note that φ contains all the information
required in order to compute players’ payoffs or any welfare criterion that only depends on
realized actions and states. The outcome φ is induced by a triple (µ, I, σ), where σ is a
strategy in (µ,G, I), if
φ (a, θ) =
∫
s∈S
σ (a|s) π (ds|θ)µ (θ) .
A Bayes correlated equilibrium (BCE) of G is an outcome that satisfies the following obedience





(ui (ai, a−i, θ)− ui (a′i, a−i, θ))φ (ai, a−i, θ) ≥ 0. (1)
The obedience constraints require that whenever the joint distribution φ (ai, a−i, θ) recom-
mends action ai to player i, then player i will find it in their interest to choose the recom-
mended action ai rather than any other action a′i. This best-response condition based on
the information conveyed by the recommendation alone is the defining condition of Bayes
correlated equilibrium. Bergemann and Morris (2013, 2016) have shown that φ is a BCE
if and only if there exists a prior µ, an information structure I, and an equilibrium σ of
(µ,G, I) such that φ is induced by (µ, I, σ).4
3 Joint Predictions and Counterfactuals
3.1 Joint Predictions with Fixed Information
Before developing our results on counterfactuals, we address the following question: Suppose








joint predictions can we make about equilibrium outcomes of these games, assuming that the
information structure is the same in each game? We have already observed that equilibrium
4Bergemann and Morris (2016) assume that S is finite, but the extension to arbitrary measurable S is
routine.
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outcomes of Gk are precisely BCE. But because players have the same information in each of
the games, there will be additional consistency requirements across the games arising from
fixed information. This section characterizes those extra restrictions, which will be central
to our analysis of counterfactuals.












is a joint prediction if there exists a prior µ, an information structure I, and for each














is defined by, for each i, Ai = A1i × · · · × AKi and














. We refer to Gk as a component game of G. An outcome φ of G can
be identified with a joint distribution in ∆
(
A1 × ....× AK ×Θ
)
.5





is a joint prediction for G1, ...,GK if and only if there exists a BCE φ of
G for which the marginal of φ on Ak ×Θ is φk for each k = 1, . . . , K.
Proof of Theorem 1. Fix a prior µ, an information structure I and strategy profile σ in(
µ, I,G
)




where σki (·|si) is the marginal of
σ (·|si) on Aki .
5The most closely related antecedent to linked games we know of is the symmetrization of two-player
games due to Brown and von Neumann (1950). Their symmetric game is essentially a linked game whose
component games are simply the original game and its “permutation,” where the players trade roles.
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each k. Observe that
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. Similarly, if there is a profitable deviation in one of the component games,









is a profitable deviation in the linked game.
In effect, Theorem 1 shows that there is revelation principle for joint predictions. In
particular, there is a canonical class of information structures that suffice to rationalize any
joint outcome of the component games, in which a player’s signal is simply their profile of
recommended actions for each component game. This is a natural extension of the logic
behind BCE: A player must at least know which action they played in each component
game, so a necessary condition for equilibrium is that the player not want to deviate con-
ditional on all of their recommended actions. Moreover, it is sufficient for them to know
their recommended actions, in order to implement equilibrium strategies that induce the
observed outcomes. Note that because of the additive separability of payoffs, the obedience
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constraints (1) specialized to the linked game reduce to the smaller set of constraints that,


















φ (ai, a−i, θ) ≥ 0. (2)
Thus, an outcome of the linked game is obedient as long as each player does not benefit from
deviating in any component game, conditional on their actions in all component games.
3.2 Counterfactuals when Information is Latent and Fixed
We now apply the preceding result to counterfactual predictions. An analyst has data about
play in an observed game G. The sets of possible states, actions, and players’ payoff functions
are known, but the analyst does not know the information structure and may have limited
data on the equilibrium distribution of states and actions.6 More specifically, the analyst
knows that the outcome φ of the observed game (i) lies in a setM ⊆ ∆ (A×Θ) (whereM is
derived from the data), (ii) it was generated under some prior µ and information structure
I, and (iii) it was induced by an equilibrium of (µ,G, I).
The analyst wants to make counterfactual predictions for what might happen if the unob-
served game Ĝ were played. But in making the counterfactual prediction, the analyst wants
to assume that µ and I remain the same. We adopt the convention that unaccented objects
correspond to the (partially) observed game and circumflex accented objects correspond to
the unobserved game, e.g., outcomes for the two games are denoted φ and φ̂, respectively.









is a counterfactual prediction if there exist µ, I, and equilibria σ




, respectively, such that the outcome φ induced by σ is in M
and such that φ̂ is induced by σ̂. The set of counterfactual predictions is denoted Φ̂.
6The assumption that states, actions, and payoffs are known is without loss of generality. This is discussed
in the Supplemental Appendix. Our results also generalize to the case where there is more than one observed
game and more than one counterfactual game, as discussed in Section 7.
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Our second main result is a characterization of Φ̂ in terms of the linked game G with
component games G and Ĝ.
Theorem 2 (Counterfactual Predictions).




is in Φ̂ if and only if there is a BCE φ of G such that (i) the
marginal of φ on A×Θ is in M and (ii) φ̂ is the marginal of φ on Â×Θ.
Proof of Theorem 2. It is immediate from the definition of a counterfactual prediction that




is a joint prediction for G. The
conclusion of the theorem is then an immediate consequence of Theorem 1.
We can represent different kinds of data through the choice ofM . For example, it could be
thatM contains a single outcome, which corresponds to the case where the joint distribution
of states and actions is observed, and the only latent parameter is the information structure.
Alternatively, if only the distribution of actions is observed, thenM contains all the outcomes
whose marginal distribution on actions coincides with the data. In this case, it is both the
information structure and the distribution of states that we infer from the data. More
broadly, the set M could be used to represent various moment restrictions from the data,
such as when only a subset of actions or statistics of actions can be observed.
In each of these cases, M can be described as the intersection of a finite number of linear
inequalities. As a result, Φ̂ is also described by finitely many linear inequalities, being the
projection onto ∆ (A×Θ) of the set of BCE of the linked game which satisfy the finitely
many obedience constraints and the constraints corresponding to M . In the special case of
















(ûi (âi, â−i, θ)− ûi (â′i, â−i, θ))φ ((ai, âi) , (a−i, â−i) , θ) ≥ 0.
(3)
If we fix a Bayesian welfare criterion w (â, θ) over ex post counterfactual outcomes, then the
range of expected values of w across all counterfactuals can be obtained by solving a pair
of finite-dimensional linear programs. We give specific examples of these linear programs in
the next section.
4 Two Examples
We now illustrate the content of Theorem 2 using two examples. The first is a discrete
version of the Roy (1951) model of self selection. The second is an entry game in the spirit
of Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) and Magnolfi and Roncoroni (2021).
4.1 One-Player Games and the Roy Model
We specialize to the case where N = 1, in which case the “game” is a decision problem being
solved by a single decision maker. We further specialize to the case where there are two
states Θ = {−1, 1} and two actions A = {0, 1}.7 In the observed game, the player’s payoff is
u (a, θ) = aθ. Thus, we have normalized the payoff from a = 0 to zero, which is without loss
of generality as long as the optimal action depends on the state. In the counterfactual, the
payoff is û (a, θ) = a (θ + z) for some z ∈ R, so that a = 1 has become more or less valuable
in both states by the same amount. The observed game corresponds to z = 0:
7We will note in the text how some results generalize beyond binary actions/states, and report these




1 −1 + z 1 + z
Table 1: Payoffs as a function of actions and states.
This problem can be viewed as a special and discretized version of the canonical model
of self-selection, first formulated by Roy (1951), in which the player decides whether or not
to opt in to some activity. Opting out (action 0) results in a certain payoff (normalized
to 0), but opting in (action 1) yields an uncertain payoff.8 The player may have imperfect
knowledge of the state that informs their decision of whether to opt in. The Roy model has
been described by Heckman (2010b) as “the prototype for many models of self-selection in
economics” (p. 264).9 In Roy (1951), opting in represents a decision to choose one occupation
over another; in Willis and Rosen (1979) or Carneiro et al. (2003) opting in represents
one schooling level over another. In the context of employment, the payoff represents the
difference in the player’s potential long-run earnings between the two occupations. In the
experimental setting, the opt in payoff is the average potential treatment effect, which may
be uncertain due to latent characteristics of the player that affect the treatment’s efficacy.
In the counterfactual, opting in becomes more or less valuable, which corresponds to a shift
in the distribution of potential wages or the distribution of potential treatment effects.
Counterfactual Welfare with Observable Outcomes We will first consider the case
where the analyst observes the entire distribution of actions and states. This corresponds to
the case originally considered by Roy (1951), in which it is assumed that wages are observed
for whatever occupation is chosen. The specific observed outcome (a, θ) is given by the
8The constant payoff associated with opting out is a notable feature—simplifying our exposition—whereas
the Roy (1951) model and most of the subsequent work has random payoffs associated with either choice of
action.
9See Heckman and Vytlacil (2007) for a canonical exposition. Abbring and Heckman (2007) survey
a recent literature that develops econometric methods for identifying the player’s information, which we









Table 2: Observed distribution of actions and states.
probabilities in Table 2 for some α ∈ [1/4, 1/2].10 Thus, both states are equally likely and
the probability that the player chooses the ex post optimal action is the same in both states.









φ (a, â, θ) =






φ (0, â, θ) θ ≤ 0 and
∑
θ
φ (1, â, θ) θ≥ 0, ∀â;
∑
θ
φ (a, 0, θ) (θ + z) ≤ 0 and
∑
θ
φ (a, 1, θ) (θ + z) ≥ 0, ∀a.
The objective is counterfactual welfare. The first constraint requires that the marginal on
the observed game is the observed outcome. The second constraint is obedience for the
observed game. The third constraint is obedience for the counterfactual. The program for
minimum counterfactual welfare is the same, except that we minimize the objective rather
than maximize.
Counterfactual welfare is plotted in the left panel of Figure 1 for α ∈ {0.5, 0.375, 0.25}.
If α = 0.5, then the player opts in if and only if the state is 1. This is possible only if the
player has full information about the state. If we change z, the player will continue to make
the ex post optimal choice, so that counterfactual welfare is the green line. If α = 0.25, then
the player enters with the same probability independent of the state. This is possible only
10The constraint α ≤ 1/2 is necessary for the probability of every outcome to be non-negative. If α < 1/4,
the player’s payoff would be negative, which is inconsistent with utility maximization, since the player can
always opt out and obtain a payoff of zero.
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(a) Fully observed outcome (b) Partially observed outcome
Figure 1: Counterfactual welfare in the Roy model.
if the player has no information: Otherwise there would be some correlation between the
action and the state. Again, in the counterfactual, the player still has no information, and
the counterfactual payoff is given by the red line. Thus, for α ∈ {0.5, 0.25} we get a point
prediction for counterfactual welfare.
If α = 0.375, then the player’s action is ex post optimal less often than can be explained
by full information and more often than can be explained by no information. Here are two
information structures that rationalize the data:
(i) Half of the time, the signal is fully informative, and the player opts in if and only if the
state is high. The other half of the time, the signal is uninformative, and the player
opts in with probability 1/2.
(ii) The player’s signal is a noisy observation of the state and the probability that s = θ is
3/4. The player opts in when the signal is 1 and opts out when the signal is −1.
Suppose that the player’s information is given by (i). As we vary z, the counterfactual payoff
is simply the average of the full- and no-information payoffs. This is the top blue line in the
left panel of Figure 1. In contrast, if information is given by (ii), then the player’s strategy
when z = 0 remains optimal as long as z ∈ [−1/2, 1/2]. When z < 1/2, the noisy signal is
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not strong enough to induce the player to opt in, and it is optimal to always opt out. When
z > 1/2, it is optimal to always opt in. The resulting welfare is given by the lower blue line
in the left panel of Figure 1.
It turns out that the information structures (i) and (ii) achieve maximum and minimum
counterfactual welfare. Thus, all we can say about the player’s counterfactual welfare is that
it lies in the hatched area between the blue lines. With regard to minimum counterfactual
welfare, observe that whatever information the player has, it must be Blackwell more infor-
mative than the signal generated by the action the player chose, which corresponds precisely
to the information structure (ii). Thus, welfare under (ii) must be weakly lower than welfare
under any other information structure that rationalizes the player’s behavior. With regard to
maximum counterfactual welfare, consider what distributions of the player’s belief about the
state are consistent with the observed behavior. The obedience constraint implies that when
a = 0 (a = 1), the player’s belief that the state is high is less than 1/2 (greater than 1/2).
In addition, the average belief is 1/4 conditional on a = 0 and 3/4 conditional on a = 1.
Among distributions of beliefs satisfying these property, the one that is most informative in
the sense of Blackwell (1953)—and is therefore associated with the highest payoff—assigns
probability 1/4 to a belief of 0, 1/4 to a belief of 1, and 1/2 to a belief of 1/2. This is
precisely the belief distribution induced by the information structure (i).
Note that for any value of α, there is a unique “local” counterfactual payoff prediction:
When z = 0, counterfactual welfare must be equal to observed welfare. The reason is that
the player can always simply repeat their observed action in the counterfactual and achieve
as high a payoff as in the observed outcome. Similarly, in the observed game, the player
could have instead mimicked their action in the counterfactual and achieved as high a payoff
as in the counterfactual outcome. Thus, the two payoffs must be equal.
Thus, we have shown that (1) minimum counterfactual welfare is attained when the
player has only the information revealed by observed behavior; (2) maximum counterfactual
welfare is attained when the player has the Blackwell most informative information structure
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consistent with observed behavior; and (3) local counterfactual welfare is unique. In the
Supplemental Appendix, we show that these properties generalize to any number of actions,
and (1) and (2) also generalize to any number of states.11 All three results rely on the fact
that there is a single player and we are looking at counterfactuals about that player’s payoff.
In the Supplemental Appendix, we give an example of a single-player game where there is
not a unique counterfactual when we look at behavior instead of payoffs. We also see the
failure of the uniqueness of the local counterfactual in the entry game in the next section.
However, the local counterfactual for welfare is unique in two-player zero-sum games, as is
shown in the Supplemental Appendix.
Partially Observed Outcomes In randomized control trials, it is natural to suppose
that the data is censored, and we only observe average treatment effects for players who opt
into the trial. Similarly, if “opting in” represents a decision to join the labor force, we would
likely not observe potential income for the unemployed. We now revisit the analysis of the
previous section, but supposing that we only observe the distribution of the state conditional
on a = 1. In the linear program, we simply replace the first constraint with
∑
â,θ
φ (0, â, θ) = 1/2,
∑
â





φ (1, â, 1) = α.
Counterfactual welfare is plotted in the right panel of Figure 1. For z < 0, the prediction
is unchanged. The reason is that for these counterfactuals, opting in is less attractive than
in the observed game, so whenever we observed the player opt out, they will also opt out in
the counterfactual, in which case the payoff is independent of the state.
When z > 0, however, the player may opt in when we observed them opt out. Exactly
how often this happens and what welfare results depends on the state distribution that
rationalizes the data. Consider first when α = 0.5, i.e., we observe the player opt in half the
11With more than two states, there may not be a Blackwell most informative information structure con-
sistent with observed behavior.
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time, but when the player opts in, the state is always high. We do not know the distribution
of the state when the player opts out. In the case considered previously, the state was always
low when the player opted out. This is the most pessimistic case, and corresponds to the
lower green curve in the right panel of Figure 1. However, obedience only requires that the
state be low at least half the time when the player opts out; in particular, the data can also
be rationalized by the state being equally likely to be high or low when the player opted
out. In this case, the counterfactual payoff would be strictly higher, since when z > 0, the
player would strictly prefer to opt in, thereby achieving the welfare on the higher green line.
Any payoff between the green lines can also be rationalized. A similar analysis explains the
upper and lower bounds for α = 0.375 and α = 0.25. Interestingly, the direction in which our
bounds expand depends on the particular observed outcome: When the observed welfare is
high, it is the upper bound on counterfactual welfare that is relaxed, whereas when observed
welfare was low, it is the lower bound that is relaxed. In the intermediate case, both upper
and lower bounds on counterfactual welfare are relaxed.
4.2 An Entry Game
Our second application is a simple entry game with entry costs, in the spirit of Ciliberto and
Tamer (2009) and Magnolfi and Roncoroni (2021). Two firms choose whether to enter (E) or
not enter (N) a market. The payoff from not entering is zero. Each firm i = 1, 2 has a cost
to enter the market ci ∈ {0, 2}. If a single firm enters, that firm earns a monopoly revenue
3. If both firms enter, they each earn revenue 2. Payoffs are summarized in the following
matrix:
a1/a2 N E
N (0, 0) (0, 3− c2)
E (3− c1, 0) (2− c1, 2− c2)
To map this game into our framework, we identify the state with the ordered pair of firms’
entry costs, that is, θ = (c1, c2).
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The outcome of the observed game is as follows: First, all entry-cost profiles are equally
likely. Second, each firm enters if and only if their cost is low. This outcome corresponds to
the unique symmetric equilibrium if each firm only knows their own cost. We assume that
the analyst observes this outcome. In the counterfactual prediction, we compute producer
surplus Û when we add z to the payoff from entry. This can be interpreted as a change in
firms’ entry costs. In Figure 2, we have plotted the counterfactual predictions for Û for z
between −3 and 2.
A detailed analysis is given in Section 8.2 in the Supplemental Appendix, where we also
explicitly write out the linear programs corresponding to maximum and minimum Û . We
now give a brief summary. First consider which information structures are consistent with
the observed outcome. Since each firm’s action is perfectly correlated with their cost, and
since firms know their own actions, they must know their own costs as well. In addition,
when z = 0, entering is strictly dominant when the cost is low. Thus, the data does not place
any further restrictions on firms’ information about the other firm’s cost when their own cost
is low. However, the data does restrict the beliefs of high-cost firms. In particular, in the
observed outcome, each firm would be just indifferent between entering and not entering if
they had no information about the other firm’s cost. If a high-cost firm’s signal contained
non-trivial information about the other firm’s cost, then they would sometimes believe that
the other firm is more likely to enter than under the prior, in which case it would be strictly
optimal to enter, thus violating obedience.
With this characterization in hand, we can now explicitly describe the information struc-
tures and equilibria that attain the maximum and minimum counterfactual predictions. As
indicated in Figure 2, there are several cases, depending on the value of z. This discussion
will focus on z > −1. The remaining cases are described in the Supplemental Appendix.
First, if z > 1, then entering is strictly dominant regardless of the entry cost, so that
there is a point prediction for welfare. There is also a unique counterfactual prediction for
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Figure 2: Counterfactual welfare in the entry game.
aggregate payoffs for z ∈ (−1, 0), which is attained in the equilibrium in which firms enter
if and only if their costs are low.
The analysis for z ∈ [0, 1] is more subtle. In this range, there is a symmetric mixed-
strategy equilibrium in which high-cost firms independently randomize between entering and
not entering. Since a high-cost firm’s payoff is zero (the payoff from not entering), all surplus
is generated by the low-cost firms. Moreover, a low-cost firm’s payoff from entering is just the
high-cost firm’s payoff from entering plus 2 (the difference in entry cost), so that aggregate
payoff is 2 in this equilibrium. However, we can see in Figure 2 that counterfactual welfare
can be both higher and lower than in the symmetric mixed equilibrium. This is possible if
firms’ entry decisions are correlated.
In particular, suppose that in addition to learning their entry costs, firms observe the
outcome of a randomization device which recommends either enter (s′i = e) or not enter




n 1− β − 2γ γ
e γ β
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where β ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0, and β+ 2γ ≤ 1, and (s′1, s′2) is independent of (c1, c2). There are choices
of β and γ for which it is an equilibrium for low-cost firms to ignore the correlation device
and always enter and for high-cost firms to enter if and only if s′i = e. To maximize producer
surplus, we choose the parameters of the correlation device to maximize the probability of one
firm entering, subject to only one firm entering at a time. The latter condition corresponds
to β = 0, in which case the obedience constraint for a high-cost firm not entering reduces to
γ ≤ z. Setting γ equal to this upper bound, we obtain the highest counterfactual producer
surplus. (In the Supplemental Appendix, we verify that the obedience constraint for high-
cost firms not entering is also satisfied.)
Similarly, to minimize producer surplus, we choose the parameters to maximize the prob-
ability that two firms enter by setting β = 1− 2γ, in which case the obedience constraint for
not entering reduces to γ ≤ (1− z) / (2− z). Setting γ equal to its upper bound, we obtain
the lowest counterfactual producer surplus. When z = 0, this outcome involves exactly one
high-cost firm entering. This lowers the aggregate payoff below the equilibrium in which
high-cost firms do not enter, because it lowers the payoffs of low-cost firms. This illustrates
the multiplicity of local counterfactual predictions when there is more than one player, due
to multiplicity of equilibria; it is also an equilibrium for firms to ignore the correlation device
and play the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium.
5 Tightening Counterfactuals and Varying Information
We now describe some straightforward extensions of the model that are relevant for appli-
cations. These extensions could be used to either shrink or expand the set of counterfactual
predictions obtained from Theorem 2. At a conceptual level, one can conceive of a wide
variety of refinements and relaxations of our notion of a counterfactual prediction, where
we impose different assumptions on players’ information and strategies and how they can
vary across games. A key question is whether these variations will retain the tractable linear
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structure that we characterized for our baseline model. The particular extensions that we
propose are notable in that the resulting set of counterfactuals is still given by the inter-
section of finitely many linear inequalities, which correspond to obedience constraints and
data restrictions. Since the extensions are rather notationally burdensome, we provide an
informal discussion, but there is a more complete and formal treatment in the working paper
Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2020).
5.1 Tightening Counterfactuals
Bounds on Information First, we can enrich the model with further restrictions on play-
ers’ information. The most straightforward such restriction is to require that the information







in the sense of individual sufficiency (Bergemann and Morris, 2016). This means that play-
ers observe signals in Ĩ (or an equivalent information structure), but may have access to
additional information. To incorporate this assumption, we expand the outcome to a joint
distribution over (a, θ, s) ∈ A×Θ× S̃, and we write φ (a, θ, s̃), etc. The moment restriction
M can now incorporate assumptions about the joint distribution of (s̃, θ). We also need to
modify the obedience constraints (2). Since player i can observe s̃i, they can condition on
it when they evaluate a deviation. Hence, the obedience constraints for the linked game are


















(ûi (âi, â−i, θ)− ûi (â′i, â−i, θ))φ ((ai, âi) , (a−i, â−i) , θ, s̃i, s̃−i) ≥ 0.
(4)
The analogue of Theorem 2 with the lower bound on information is as follows: An out-










, satisfying the generalized obedience conditions (4), such that φ̂ is the
marginal of φ on Â × Θ × S̃, and the marginal of φ on A × Θ × S̃ is in M . When Ĩ is
uninformative (i.e., s̃ is independent of θ), this characterization reduces to Theorem 2. But
as Ĩ becomes more informative in the sense of individual sufficiency, the set of counterfac-
tual predictions must shrink. (This follows immediately from Theorem 2 of Bergemann and
Morris (2016).)
A particularly relevant special case is that of public regressors, i.e., covariates x that
are common knowledge among the players when they choose their actions. In this case,
we can set s̃i = x for all i, and π̃ captures the correlation between x and θ. This is how
public regressors are modeled in Magnolfi and Roncoroni (2021).12 Another important case
is private values : In many applications, such as auctions, the state can be decomposed as
θ = (θ1, . . . , θN) into player-specific components, and player i’s preferences depend only
on θi. In addition, we often assume that each player knows their own payoff type, which
we can model by setting s̃i = θi. For example, in the entry example of Section 4.2, the
components of θ are the firms’ costs, and we could impose a lower bound on information
that each firm knows their own cost (as is generally assumed in the applied literature). In
fact, this lower bound would not have changed the counterfactual prediction in our example,
since the observed outcome revealed that firms knew their costs anyway. However, if we
observed a different game, say, that from the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium where the
benefits from entering would be sufficiently larger than 2, then the data would be consistent
with firms not knowing their own costs, and assuming private costs would lead to a tighter
counterfactual prediction. (Incidentally, Magnolfi and Roncoroni (2021) assume that entry
costs are private, and Syrgkanis et al. (2021) consider private-value auctions in which each
bidder knows their own value for the good being sold.)
12A conceptually distinct way to model the public regressor is by regarding each realization of x as a






. This formulation implicitly assumes that the players’ signals are condi-
tionally independent of x, whereas the approach developed in the main text allows for correlation between
signals and public regressors.
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Note that the observed outcome is itself a lower bound on information, in the sense
that players must know the action they took in the observed game. Similarly, the observed
outcome is also an upper bound on information: Players cannot have so much information
that they would have preferred to deviate from their observed actions. In many cases, this
upper bound on information is abstract and difficult to interpret. But we can contemplate
games for which there is a natural interpretation of the implied upper bounds on information.
Consider a game in which the players do not interact at all; they simply try to guess the
state, and are incentivized to be as accurate as possible. If we were to observe players not
always guessing the state correctly, then we would know that their information about the
state must be bounded away from full information.13
Payoff Shifters A common device in applied microeconomics is to assume that there are
exogenous “payoff shifters” that affect a player’s utility and are observable to the player and
to the econometrician (Tamer, 2003; Jia, 2008; Bajari et al., 2010; Somaini, 2020). Actions
and shifters together provide much richer information about players’ information than just
the action. Such payoff shifters are easily incorporated into our framework.
For each i, let ωi be a shifter for player i’s payoffs in the observed game, which takes
values in a finite set Ωi. Player i′s payoff is now of the form ui (a, θ, ωi). Suppose ωi is directly
observable to player i but not to players −i and let η (ω|θ) denote the conditional distribution
of the entire profile of payoff shifters. (We are assuming that η can be separately identified
from the data.) In addition, we assume that players do not learn anything about ω from
their signals in the information structure. Since each player can observe their component of
ω, they may condition on it when choosing their action. We can therefore reduce this game
to a normal form in which player i’s action is a strategy ξi that maps payoff shifters into a
13An alternative approach would be to restrict attention to information structures that are less informative
than some fixed Ĩ. But this is equivalent to requiring that there exist kernels Ki : S̃i → ∆ (Ai) such that∑
a−i∈A−i
φ (ai, a−i, s̃i, s̃−i, θ) = Ki (ai|s̃i)
∑
a′∈A
φ (a′, s̃i, s̃−i, θ) , (5)
a constraint that is non-linear in Ki and φ.
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pure action ai. (It is without loss to restrict player i to pure mappings, since we allow them
to mix over pure strategies, as in the baseline model.) Player i’s payoff as a function of the
strategy profile is
u (ξ, θ) =
∑
ω∈Ω
η (ω|θ)ui (ξ (ω) , θ, ω) .
We can now immediately apply Theorem 2 to the normal form game in which a player’s
action is their strategy.
The value of the payoff shifters is that the implied richness of the observed game may
reveal more information about players’ information. We can illustrate this with a variation
on the Roy model of Section 4.1. Suppose we first make the counterfactual problem harder,
by having the analyst not observe anything about the state in the original game. However,
we suppose that the player observes a payoff shifter ω, which is distributed uniformly on
[−1, 1] and independent of the player’s signal and the state.14 The payoff from opting out is
still normalized to zero, but the payoff to a player who opts in is θ + 1− 2ω.15
Further suppose that we observe the joint distribution of (a, ω). Let p denote the interim
probability that the player assigns to θ = 1. Opting out is optimal only if
p− (1− p) + 1− 2ω ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ p ≤ ω.
Thus, the probability of opting out given ω is precisely the probability that p is less than ω.
Indeed, if we write P (ω) for the probability of a = 0 given ω, then P (ω) is the cumulative
distribution of the player’s interim belief. This distribution of the interim beliefs describes
all features of the player’s information that are relevant for counterfactual predictions. In
that sense, the payoff shifter allows us to point identify the information structure.
14We let the payoff shifter be a continuous variable. It would be straightforward but slightly less elegant
to make the same points with a finite set of realizations (consistent with the rest of our model), in which
case we would be able to identify the cumulative distribution of the player’s belief at finitely many points.
15This functional form is chosen so that we obtain a clean expression for the distribution of beliefs. Note
that this model is neither a generalization nor a special case of the model of Section 4.1.
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5.2 Variable Information
Our focus in this paper is on counterfactuals when the base game changes but fundamentals
and information are held fixed. This notion of counterfactual is entirely standard: We
change one feature of the environment (the base game) and keep everything else the same.
It is also implicitly adopted in the vast majority of applied work on incomplete information
games, generally along with even stronger functional form assumptions (e.g., independent
or affiliated private values in the literature on auctions). At the same time, while fixed
information is a natural benchmark, we may also wish to consider cases where information
can vary between the observed game and the counterfactual. This would be reasonable if
the players have opportunities to acquire more or different information between the observed
game and the counterfactual.16 In fact, we can accommodate a variety of such “variable-
information” counterfactuals within our framework, and different assumptions about how
information can vary can be captured by suitably modifying the obedience constraints (3).
In the most extreme case, one could allow information to vary in an arbitrary way between
the observed game and the counterfactual. This corresponds to the unrestricted-information
counterfactuals approach discussed in the introduction and applied by Magnolfi and Ron-
coroni (2021) and Syrgkanis et al. (2021). In this case, we simply have to modify the
obedience constraints for the linked game: When deciding whether or not to deviate in the
observed game (resp. counterfactual game), players should only condition on their action in
the observed game (resp. counterfactual game), since the action in the other game may be
based on entirely different information. Thus, the obedience constraints become, for all i,
16For much the same reason, we may also wish to consider cases where the distribution of fundamentals
varies as we vary the base game. Indeed, we view the fixed information hypothesis in much the same way
as we view fixed fundamentals: a natural benchmark, but one that should be regarded with appropriate
skepticism, depending on the application. It would be straightforward to adapt our methodology to allow
for some features of the state distribution to vary between observation and counterfactual. Of course, if
the base game, information, and fundamentals can all change in an unrestricted manner, then connection
between the observed and unobserved games is lost, and our so-called counterfactual prediction would simply
reduce to BCE of the unobserved game.
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(ûi (âi, â−i, θ)− ûi (â′i, â−i, θ))φ (a, âi, â−i, θ) ≥ 0. (6b)
This is equivalent to allowing arbitrary BCE in the observed and counterfactual games,
with the only requirement being that the BCE have the same marginal distribution over the
fundamental.
Alternatively, one could assume that in the counterfactual game, players know as much
as they knew in the observed game, but they may know more. In this case, the obedience
constraints for observed actions (6a) stay the same, but the constraints for the counterfactual
(6b) become, for all i, ai, âi, and â′i:
∑
â−i,a−i,θ
(ûi (âi, â−i, θ)− ûi (â′i, â−i, θ))φ (ai, a−i, âi, â−i, θ) ≥ 0.
Thus, when deciding whether or not to deviate in the counterfactual game, players are able
to condition on both their observed and counterfactual actions.
Going a step further, we could even combine this approach with the lower bounds on
information discussed in Section 5.1, and suppose that in the counterfactual game, the
players observe signals s̃ (with known distribution) which were not available in the observed
game.17 In this case, the obedience constraints for the counterfactual (6b) become, for all i,
17Dickstein and Morales (2018) consider such a counterfactual in the context of international trade, with
a more parametric model of firms’ information when they decide whether or not to export.
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(a) Roy model (b) Entry game
Figure 3: Counterfactuals with fixed vs unrestricted information.
ai, s̃i, âi, and â′i:18
∑
â−i,a−i,s̃−i,θ
(ûi (âi, â−i, θ)− ûi (â′i, â−i, θ))φ (ai, a−i, âi, â−i, s̃, θ) ≥ 0.
This is by no means an exhaustive list: The methodology in this paper can accommodate
a wide variety of assumptions about how information varies between observed and counter-
factual games. One can also allow for players to have less information in the counterfactual,
which would be relevant, say, in a counterfactual where we impose that a monopolist cannot
price based on some observable characteristic of consumers.
As an illustration of unrestricted-information counterfactuals, we computed unrestricted-
information counterfactuals in the examples of Section 4, which are depicted in Figure 3. As
expected, the counterfactual prediction is more permissive with unrestricted information than
with fixed information. For the Roy model, the only restriction from the data is that both
states are equally likely. Blackwell’s theorem (Blackwell, 1953) implies that counterfactual
18An important subtlety in this counterfactual is that players observe s̃ and possibly more. The reason
is that when we use ãi to represent player i’s information in the counterfactual game, we cannot separate
the “part” of ãi that depends on s̃ from that which depends on information available in the observed game.
Imposing the restriction that players observe a new orthogonal signal s̃ and nothing more would require us
to explicitly model the information that gave rise to observed behavior.
28
welfare is maximized when the player has full information, in which case the player chooses
the optimal ex post action. On the other hand, counterfactual welfare is minimized when
they have no information, in which case opting in is optimal only if z ≥ 0. The counterfactual
predictions for welfare is everything between these two extremes. There is no more that we
can say.
6 Related Empirical and Econometric Work
A growing number of papers has already successfully employed the BCE characterization in
developing informationally-robust identification and counterfactuals; notably (as discussed in
the introduction) Magnolfi and Roncoroni (2021) and Syrgkanis, Tamer, and Ziani (2021).19
We now describe these papers in more detail, and explain their connection to our results.
Magnolfi and Roncoroni (2021) consider an entry game with binary actions. Firms’
preferences and the distribution of entry costs depend on a parameter ω ∈ Ω.20 Firms’
entry costs correspond to the payoff-relevant state θ in the present paper. Magnolfi and
Roncoroni (2021) suppose that firms know their own entry costs but may have arbitrary
information about other firms’ entry costs, which can be identified with BCE in which
firms know their own costs (cf. the discussion in Section 5.1). Magnolfi and Roncoroni
(2021) identify the subset of Ω for which there exists such a BCE that matches the observed
distribution of actions. Thus, the presumption is that the parameter ω is the same for all
realizations of the game that contributed to the data. In their main counterfactual analysis,
the base game changes, the parameter ω is held fixed, but the information can vary in
an arbitrary manner between the observed and counterfactual games. This corresponds to
the unrestricted-information counterfactual that we discussed in Section 5.2, which is more
permissive than the fixed-information counterfactual characterized by Theorem 2. Following
19Both Magnolfi and Roncoroni (2021) and Syrgkanis, Tamer, and Ziani (2021) were circulated before the
present paper. We cite only the most recent versions.
20Magnolfi and Roncoroni (2021) denote the parameter by θ. We use the letter ω to avoid confusion with
the notation used in this paper for the payoff-relevant state.
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earlier versions of this paper, Magnolfi and Roncoroni (2021) added an analysis of fixed-
information counterfactuals and found that fixed information substantially reduces the range
of counterfactual outcomes.
Syrgkanis, Tamer, and Ziani (2021) used the BCE characterization in analyzing bidding
behavior in generalized second-price and first-price auctions, treating separately on the cases
of pure common values and private values. In contrast to Magnolfi and Roncoroni (2021),
Syrgkanis, Tamer, and Ziani (2021) do not parametrize players’ preferences or the distribu-
tion of the payoff-relevant state (which in their case is the vector of bidders’ values). Rather,
they implicitly describe the identified set of value distributions as marginals of the BCE that
are consistent with the observed distribution of actions. In this respect, their analysis makes
a more direct use of the BCE characterization than Magnolfi and Roncoroni (2021), who use
random set theory and support function to characterize the identified set of parameter val-
ues. Syrgkanis, Tamer, and Ziani (2021) then compute counterfactual predictions when the
auction format changes, say, from a generalized second-price auction to a first-price auction,
and when information can vary arbitrarily between the observed and counterfactual games.
Thus, they also compute unrestricted-information counterfactuals. We suspect that their
analysis can be extended to fixed-information counterfactuals.
The scope of our paper is limited to the question of partial identification of counterfac-
tuals, when the “data” is in the form of an exact moment (or moments) of the population
outcome. We do not address the fundamental issue of how to conduct inference on the coun-
terfactual prediction when one only has access to a noisy estimate derived from a finite data
set, which of course plays a central role in the empirical papers described above.
In related work, Gualdani and Sinha (2020) maintain the fixed counterfactuals assump-
tion in their application to a single agent discrete choice model of voting. Canen and Song
(2020) introduce a decomposition approach used frequently in labor economics to offer coun-
terfactual predictions in strategic settings using BCE as the solution concept.
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A common and novel feature of all of this work is a general and non-parametric treat-
ment of the information structure. By contrast, the vast literature on the Roy model, our
leading example in Section 4, has addressed imperfect information largely with a parametric
approach, see Abbring and Heckman (2007) for a comprehensive survey. As emphasized
by Heckman (2010a), agents will base their treatment decisions on their beliefs about the
outcome, referred to as ex-ante evaluations or ex-ante outcomes, whereas the econometrician
typically observes the ex-post outcomes. A recent strand of literature, including Carneiro
et al. (2003), Cunha et al. (2005) among others, has developed methods for identifying agents’
information and separating the ex-ante and ex-post outcome distributions. The identifica-
tion of the information structure is typically based on the assumption that the returns from
treatment depends in a known manner on a specific set of factors, and the agent’s information
is identified with the subset of factors that are observed when treatment is chosen.
Our approach models information entirely non-parametrically and treats it as a nui-
sance parameter that is of interest only insofar as it influences the counterfactual prediction.
Building on the prior results on informationally-robust identification and inference with un-
restricted information due to Magnolfi and Roncoroni (2021) and Syrgkanis, Tamer, and
Ziani (2021), we established that we can both allow for arbitrary and unobservable informa-
tion structures and yet hold the information structure fixed when computing counterfactuals.
This insight could be used in a wide range of microeconometric applications, including those
mentioned above.
7 Conclusion
Our first result (Theorem 1) characterized the precise implications of Bayesian rationality
and common priors for joint predictions in games, under the hypothesis of fixed information.
Theorem 2 applied that result to derive counterfactual predictions under fixed and latent
information. We have shown that there is a sharp description of the set of counterfactual
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outcomes that are consistent with observed data. The main virtues of our approach are its
analytical tractability and the minimalist assumptions about the form of information and
equilibrium selection. These two go hand in hand: it is precisely because we allow a large set
of information structures and equilibria that the set of counterfactual predictions has a simple
linear structure. In spite of the weakness of our assumptions, we have demonstrated through
examples that the predictive power of fixed information can be significant, in particular
compared to what can be predicted if we do not fix information between observation and
counterfactual. Moreover, we have shown that it is possible to refine the counterfactual
predictions with further assumptions on the information structure, although only certain
kinds of assumptions about information will preserve the linear structure.
Theorem 1 has implications beyond counterfactuals, and we will conclude the paper by
discussing three. First, Theorem 1 implies a simple test of the hypothesis that the players
had the same information in the component games; observed outcomes can be rationalized
by a common information structure if and only if there exists a BCE of the linked game for
which the marginals are the observed outcomes.
Second, Theorem 1 can be used to generate informationally-robust rankings of games, as
we now explain. Suppose that there are two games of interest Gk for k = 1, 2. An analyst
assigns a value to each outcome of Gk. This value is used to compare outcomes across games.
For example, G1 and G2 may be entry games with different barriers to entry, and the value
is social surplus. Or they may represent different auction formats and the value is expected
revenue. The question is, which game is associated with a higher value?
Let us say that G1 dominates G2 if for every information structure I, and equilibria
of (I,G1) and (I,G2), the induced outcome for G1 has higher value than to the induced
outcome of G2.21 Theorem 1 immediately implies the following: G1 dominates G2 if and only
if for every BCE φ of the linked game with component games G1 and G2, the value of φ1 is
greater than that of φ2, where φk is the marginal of φ on Gk. When the games are finite,
21We thank Jeff Ely for suggesting this notion of dominance.
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determining dominance with fixed information reduces to checking the feasibility of a finite
system of linear inequalities.
Third, we could combine the informationally-robust rankings and counterfactual predic-
tions. In particular, we could suppose that there is an observed game G and two counterfac-
tual games Ĝ1 and Ĝ2. We can ask: does Ĝ1 dominate Ĝ2, subject to observed behavior in G
and the constraint that the information structure is the same in all three games? One can
answer this question by first forming the linked game with components G, Ĝ1, and Ĝ2. Then,
Ĝ1 dominates Ĝ2 if and only if for every BCE of the linked game that is consistent with the
data, the marginal on Ĝ1 has greater value than the marginal on Ĝ2. In the Supplemental
Appendix, we report examples of such informationally-robust rankings on counterfactuals
for both the Roy model and the entry game. Further developing these and other applications
of Theorem 1 is an important direction for future work.
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This appendix is organized as follows. Section 8.1 presents general results on single-player
counterfactuals and contains additional examples based on the Roy model of Section 4, in-
cluding informationally-robust rankings as described in Section 7. Section 8.2 provides a
more formal and complete analysis of the entry game of Section 4.2. Section 8.3 studies
counterfactual predictions in two-player zero-sum games. Section 8.4 studies counterfactu-
als in a first-price auction with reserve price. Section 8.5 discusses how various nominal
assumptions in the model of Section 2 are in fact normalizations and are without loss of
generality.
8.1 Single Player Example: Further Analysis
In Section 4.1, we explained how in single-player games, minimum counterfactual welfare is
obtained with the minimally informative information structure, in which a player’s signal is
their observed action. We now give a general statement of this result:
Proposition 1 (Minimum single-player counterfactual welfare).
Suppose N = 1, and fix an observed decision problem G = (A, u) and moment restriction
M = {φ}. Define an information structure I = (S, π) by S = A and such that π (a|θ)µ (θ) =
φ (a, θ) for all a and θ. Then I rationalizes the observed outcome. Moreover, for every




, the minimum expected counterfactual welfare
across all counterfactual predictions is attained when the information structure is I, and







φ (a, θ) û (â, θ) .
The proof is elementary, and follows the argument given in the text.
We next give a general statement of the result that with binary states, there is a minimally
informative information structure which attains minimum counterfactual welfare. When
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Θ = {θ1, θ2}, we can represent the player’s belief conditional on their signal as the probability
that the state is θ1. For each observed action a ∈ A, there is an interval of beliefs for which
that action is optimal, which we can denote by
[
xL (a) , xH (a)
]
. Conditional on taking the
action a, every realized belief must be in this interval. The Blackwell-most informative belief
distribution consistent with the data must have all of the mass concentrated on the end points
of this interval. Any information structure that generates this distribution of beliefs will
maximize the player’s welfare in all counterfactual decision problems. One such information


























where π (a,H|θ1) = φ (a, θ1) /µ (θ1) and π (a,H|θ2) = 0 if xH (a) = 1. Otherwise, if xL (a) =
xH (a), then we can take π (a,H|θ1) = π (a,H|θ2) = 1. With this information structure, the
player has an optimal strategy to choose a after the signals (a,H) and (a, L). Moreover, I is
Blackwell-more informative than any other information structure that rationalizes the data.
We have proven the following proposition:
Proposition 2.
Suppose that N = 1 and Θ = {θ1, θ2}, and fix an observed game G = (A, u) and moment
restriction M = {φ}. Then the information structure I described in the preceding paragraph
rationalizes the observed outcome. Moreover, for every counterfactual decision problem Ĝ =(
Â, û
)
, the maximum expected counterfactual welfare across all counterfactual predictions is







û (â, θ) π (a, k|θ)µ (θ) .
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At a high level, this result depends on the fact that the set of distributions over beliefs
partially ordered by mean-preserving spreads is a lattice when |Θ| = 2. When |Θ| > 2,
this partially ordered set is no longer a lattice, and in particular, there need not be a most
informative distribution of beliefs that rationalizes the data.
Finally, we argue that there is always a unique local counterfactual in single-player games:
Proposition 3.
Suppose that N = 1 and M = {φ}. If the counterfactual game Ĝ is equal to G, then there is





u (a, θ)φ (a, θ) .
The argument is that given in the text: Fix an information structure I and observed and
counterfactual equilibrium strategies σ and σ̂ (that is, σ and σ̂ are optimal decision rules).















u (a, θ) σ̂ (a|s) π (s|θ)µ (θ) .
But σ̂ is a feasible strategy in the observed game, so the fact that σ is an equilibrium must
be U ≥ Û . By an analogous argument, Û ≥ U , so in fact they are equal. Finally, by the
definition of a counterfactual prediction, we must have that σ and I induce φ, so that U is
equal to welfare under φ.
Ranking two counterfactuals We will next use the Roy model to illustrate the method-
ology for ranking games discussed in Section 7. Specifically, we ask for which pairs of coun-
terfactual parameters z1 and z2 does the agent always attain higher welfare under z1 than
under z2, when we restrict attention to those information structures which are consistent




of agent welfare obtained
for the pairs (z1, z2) = (0.5, 0.75) when the observed outcome corresponds to α = 0.375, both
39
Figure 4: Ranking counterfactuals in the Roy model.
under the assumption of fully-observable outcomes (the blue set) and partially-observable
outcomes (the red set).
The picture clearly shows that agent is unambiguously better off under z2. This can be
seen from the fact that all of the sets lie above the 45 degree line. Indeed, this conclusion
is theoretically trivial: the counterfactual with z2 has payoffs that are pointwise higher, so
that the agent could achieve a higher payoff with z2 than with z1 simply by using whatever
strategy was optimal for z1. Note that while this conclusion is theoretically obvious, it is
not apparent in Figure 1: For many pairs z2 > z1, the set of possible welfare outcomes for
the agent overlap. It is only by plotting agent welfare resulting from joint counterfactual
predictions that we can see that higher values of z dominate.
Nonetheless, this example illustrates the power of fixing information when computing
informationally-robust rankings: Without holding information fixed, there would be no dom-
inance ranking between z1 and z2, whenever the two are sufficiently close together.
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Welfare versus behavior In Section 4.1, we primarily focused on the player’s welfare.
This is not the only counterfactual outcome of interest. More broadly, we may ask how the
player’s behavior could change in the counterfactual, i.e., the probability of opting in for each
state. While we do not analyze this question in detail, we can say that there are generally
much weaker restrictions on behavior than on welfare. This is illustrated in Figure 5, which
depicts the total probability that the player opts in as we vary z, for the cases considered
above.
The left panel describes the counterfactual probability of opting in when we observe the
entire outcome, including the state distribution when the player opts out. When the observed
outcome is consistent with either either no information (the green curve) or full information
(the blue curve), there is generically a point prediction for counterfactual behavior. However,
for no information and z = 0, there are counterfactual predictions consistent with any opt-in
probability between zero and one. This is true even though there is a point prediction for
counterfactual welfare, simply because when z = 0, the player is indifferent between actions.
For the intermediate case of partial information, there is always a fat set of counterfactual
opt-in probabilities. Again, this is true even when z = 0, when there is a point prediction
for welfare.
The counterfactual prediction for behavior when we do not observe the state after opting
out is depicted in the right panel of Figure 5. The prediction is even more permissive in this
case: For every z > 0, any opt-in probability between 1/2 and 1 is consistent with all three
cases considered. For, in each of these examples, the player must always opt in when the
state is good, and there is a state distribution that rationalizes the player’s observed decision
to opt out when z = 0 but such that they would strictly prefer to enter if z > 0.
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Figure 5: Counterfactual probability p of choosing the action a = 1.
8.2 Entry Game: Further Analysis



















φ (N,E, â1, â2, c1, c2) (3− c1) + φ (N,N, â1, â2, c1, c2) (1− c1)
]




φ (E,E, â1, â2, c1, c2) (3− c1) + φ (E,N, â1, â2, c1, c2) (1− c1)
]




φ (E,N, â1, â2, c1, c2) (3− c2) + φ (N,N, â1, â2, c1, c2) (1− c2)
]




φ (E,E, â1, â2, c1, c2) (3− c2) + φ (N,E, â1, â2, c1, c2) (1− c2)
]




φ (a1, a2, N,E, c1, c2) (3 + z − c1) + φ (a1, a2, N,N, c1, c2) (1 + z − c1)
]




φ (a1, a2, E, E, c1, c2) (3 + z − c1) + φ (a1, a2, E,N, c1, c2) (1 + z − c1)
]




φ (a1, a2, N,E, c1, c2) (3 + z − c2) + φ (a1, a2, N,N, c1, c2) (1 + z − c2)
]




φ (a1, a2, E, E, c1, c2) (3 + z − c2) + φ (a1, a2, N,E, c1, c2) (1 + z − c2)
]
≥ 0 ∀ (a2, c2) .42
The program for minimizing counterfactual producer surplus is the same, except that we
change the maximization to minimization.
Detailed calculations for entry counterfactuals In this appendix, we analytically con-
struct the equilibria that attain the boundaries of the numerically computed counterfactual
prediction in Figure 2. We do not give a proof that these bounds are optimal.
Both firms always entering is an equilibrium if z ≥ 1, and the resulting payoff is 2 (1 + z)−
2 = 2 (3 + z) − 6. This is the unique counterfactual prediction when z > 1, when entering
becomes strictly dominant.
When z < 1, always entering is not an equilibrium. As long as z ≥ 0, there is a mixed
strategy equilibrium in which low-cost firms always enter and a firm with high cost enters
with probability α, to make the other firm indifferent between entering and not entering:
3 + z − (1 + α)/2− 2 = 0 ⇐⇒ α = z.
Thus, these strategies are an equilibrium for z ∈ [0, 1]. Since this equilibrium makes high-
cost firms indifferent between entering and not entering, the payoff of the high-cost firm is
zero, and the payoff when the cost is low is just the high cost, which is 2, so that the overall
payoff in this equilibrium is 2.
We now construct equilibria for z ∈ [0, 1] that attain the upper and lower bounds of
the counterfactual welfare. Firms observe the outcome of a correlation device that produces
signals (s1, s2) that are independent of the firms’ costs and has the following probabilities:
s1/s2 0 1
0 1− β − 2γ γ
1 γ β
where γ ∈ [0, 1/2] and β ∈ [0, (1− γ)/2]. In the equilibria we now construct, low-cost firms
ignore this signal and always enter, but a high-cost firm i enters if and only if si = 1.
43
The obedience constraints are as follows: Conditional on si = 1, the likelihood of the other
firm entering is (γ + 2β)/(2γ + 2β). The reason is that the other firm will enter regardless
of their signal if their cost is low, but will only enter if they get the high signal when their
cost is high. Conditional on this signal, the payoff from entering must be non-negative:
1 + z − 2 γ + 2β
2(γ + β)
≥ 0.
Similarly, conditional on being told to not enter and having a high cost, the payoff from
entering must be non-positive:
1 + z − 21− β − 2γ + 2γ
2(1− β − γ)
≤ 0.















To obtain minimum counterfactual welfare, we set β = 1 − 2γ and make the obedience
constraint for entering hold as an equality. Intuitively, we are pushing down welfare by
having firms enter with high probability. Solving for β, we obtain
β = 1− 2γ = z
2− z
.
It is straightforward to verify that the obedience constraint for entering is always satisfied
with these values for β and γ and z ∈ [0, 1]. The resulting aggregate payoff is
2 + z − 1
2− z
.
which coincides with the simulated minimum counterfactual welfare.
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For maximum counterfactual welfare, we set β = 0 and make the obedience constraint
for not entering hold as an equality. Intuitively, we increase welfare by having firms enter
less often, so as to avoid the low-payoff from duopoly. Solving for γ, we obtain






So γ goes from 0 to 1/2 as z goes from 0 to 1. Note that when β = 0, the obedience constraint
for entering is unambiguously satisfied, since the left-hand side reduces to 1/2, and the right
hand side is always at least 1/2. The resulting payoff is
2 (3 + z)− 4− 2 z
1− z
,
which coincides with the simulation.
We next consider the equilibrium to enter if and only if ci = 0. The payoff from entering
with a low cost is clearly positive. The payoff from entering with the high cost is just z, and
the payoff from entering with a low cost is 2 + z, so this is an equilibrium if z ∈ [−2, 0]. The






= 1 + z.
This is the unique counterfactual prediction when z ∈ (−1, 0), and it is the lower boundary
of the counterfactual prediction when z ∈ [−2,−1).
If z ∈ [−3,−2], there is an equilibrium in which low-cost firms mix over whether they
enter, which results in a payoff of zero. This attains the lower boundary of the counterfactual
prediction for z ∈ [−3,−2].
Next we construct the producer surplus maximizing BCE when z ∈ [−3,−1]. Using a
correlation device as we did above for z ∈ [0, 1], we can coordinate the low firms’ behavior
so that firms enter only if they have low cost, a firm enters with probability one if they are
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the only low-cost firm, and when both firms have low-cost, and exactly one firm enters when
both firms have low cost. This is obviously an equilibrium: Entering is strictly dominated
for high signals, and if a firm with low cost does not enter in equilibrium, then the other low-
cost firm must be entering, so the payoff from deviating would be 1 + z ≤ 0. The resulting
aggregate payoff would be 3 (3 + z) /4 (that is, 3/4 of the time exactly one firm enters, and
it is a firm with low cost). This coincides with the upper boundary of the simulation.
Finally, we construct an equilibrium that attains the low payoff at z = −1. First, there
is a correlation device as above when γ = 1/2. In addition, we assume that low-cost firms
can observe the cost of the other firm. Consider the following strategies: A high-cost firm
enters if and only if si = 1. A low cost firm enters with probability 1 if the other firm’s cost
is low or if the other firm’s cost is high and si = 1. Otherwise, when the other firm’s cost
is high and si = 0, the low-cost firm does not enter. The high-cost firm gets zero surplus
from entering. Relative to the equilibrium where firms enter if and only if the cost is low,
producer surplus has dropped by 1/2, since 1/4 of the time it is a high cost firm entering as
a monopolist rather than a low-cost firm. This equilibrium is knife edge: First, it depends
on the fact that the loss from duopoly is the same as the high entry cost, so that the low-cost
firm is indifferent to entering as a duopolist, and the high-cost firm is indifferent to entering
as a monopolist. Second, if z is a little bigger than 1, low-cost firms would strictly prefer to
enter when the high-cost firm enters, and if z is a little smaller than 1, the high-cost firm
would be unwilling to enter.
Informationally-Robust Rankings in the Entry Game In this appendix, we conduct
version of the joint counterfactual prediction analysis described in Section 7. In this case,
we ask whether higher z are necessarily associated with higher payoffs for the firms. We
conducted six versions of this counterfactual, which are depicted in Figure 6.
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We computed joint predictions for counterfactual producer surplus for two different coun-
terfactual games: z = −0.6 and z = −0.4. Three versions of this computation under different
informational assumptions are depicted in Figure 6.
First, we computed a counterfactual prediction when we restrict attention to information
structures that can rationalize the data used in Section 4.2, namely that when z = 0, firms
enter if and only if their cost is low. Thus, in this example, we are actually computing joint
predictions for three games, where z ∈ {−0.6,−0.4, 0}, and we impose a data restriction on
the z = 0 game and plot the set of pairs of counterfactual producer surplus for the games
with z = −0.6 and z = −0.4. In fact, for this case, the set of joint counterfactual predictions
can immediately be read from Figure 2: For z ∈ (−1, 0), there is a unique counterfactual
prediction for aggregate payoffs under fixed information, and this prediction is increasing in
z. Indeed, we see in Figure 6 that the joint counterfactual prediction when we have the data
restriction is the single blue point. This point is above the 45 degree, meaning that the firms
are unambiguously better off in the aggregate when z = −0.4 than they are when z = −0.6.
Second, for these same parameters, we computed a joint prediction when we impose that
the same information structure is used for both values of z, but we allow all private-cost
information structures (depicted in red). In this case, the joint prediction spans both sides
of the 45 degree line, so that z = −0.4 does not dominate z = −0.6 with fixed information,
when we do not have a restriction from the data. A fortiori, z = −0.4 does not dominate
z = −0.6 under unrestricted information, even when we restrict to private-cost information
structures.
Third, we computed the joint prediction when we allow all information structures. This
most permissive joint prediction for producer surplus is in green. Again, it is clear that
neither game dominates the other.
This example illustrates the potential benefit of combining methodologies: When we use
only joint predictions for informationally-robust rankings, without a data-based restriction,
47
Figure 6: Joint counterfactuals in the entry game.
it is not possible to rank z = −0.6 and z = −0.4. But when we use data to further refine
the joint counterfactual prediction, we do obtain an unambiguous ranking.
8.3 Two-Player Zero-Sum Game
We now consider a setting with two players, binary actions, and binary states. The observed
game is the following:
θ = 0
a1/a2 0 1
0 (2,−2) (−1, 1)
1 (−1, 1) (0, 0)
θ = 1
a1/a2 0 1
0 (0, 0) (−1, 1)
1 (−1, 1) (2,−2)
In each state, the game has the form of an asymmetric matching pennies. Both states are
equally likely, so that in expectation the game is symmetric. Thus, if the players have no
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information about the state, there is a unique equilibrium in which they both randomize
with equal probabilities, and both players’ payoffs are zero. If they have full information
about the state, then there is again a unique (and symmetric) equilibrium in which they
play a = 0 with probability 1/4 in state θ = 0, and they play a = 0 with probability 3/4 in
state θ = 1. In both states, player 1’s payoff is −1/4.
We assume that we have observed φ exactly, and φ (a, θ) = 1/8 for all (a, θ). This
is the joint distribution of states and actions that arises under no information. In the
counterfactual, we multiply all of the payoffs by a factor 2 − z in state 0 and by z in state
1, for some z ∈ [0, 2]. This is equivalent to varying the relative likelihoods of the two states.
The observed game corresponds to z = 1. The counterfactual outcome of interest is player
1’s payoff.
We numerically computed maximum and minimum payoffs for player 1 for a fine grid
of z values. The range of counterfactual outcomes under variable and fixed information are
depicted in Figure 7 as a function of z. When information is variable, then again, the only
thing we learn from the data is that both states are equally likely. The gray lines represent
upper and lower bounds on welfare. The range of possible outcomes is largest at z = 1,
when the counterfactual game is a copy of the observed game. In this case, any payoff in
[−1/2, 1/2] can be attained with some information structure. The highest payoff of 1/2
can be achieved by letting player 1 observe the state and player 2 receiving no information.
Under that information, there is an equilibrium where â1 = θ and player 2 mixes with equal
probabilities. Similarly, the payoff of −1/2 can be achieved by giving no information to
player 1 and full information to player 2. In fact, it is a result of Peski (2008) that these are
the information structures that achieve extreme welfare outcomes in any two-player zero-sum
game, and it is not particular to our example.22
22Here is a sketch of the proof. Player 1’s payoff in (G, I) is at least their maxmin payoff, where the max
and min are taken over player 1 and player 2’s strategies, respectively. Player 2 has the option to use a
strategy that does not depend on their private information t2, so player 1’s maxmin payoff would increase
if we restricted player 2 to use only those constant strategies. This is what happens if player 2 has no
information. Next, if we look at information structures where only player 1 gets information, then it must
be that player 1’s payoff is maximized by having as much information is possible. For, any strategy under
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Figure 7: Counterfactual payoffs for player 1 in the zero-sum game.
Note that when z = 0 or z = 1, then payoffs are zero in one state, so that it is effectively a
game with a single state, and thus the value of the game is uniquely pinned down independent
of the information.
When we fix information, the range of counterfactual outcomes is tighter. Indeed, when
z = 1, there is a unique counterfactual prediction when the counterfactual game coincides
with the observed game. Once again, this is a general insight that is not particular to
our example. In any two-player zero-sum game, if there is an information structure I and
equilibrium σ that rationalizes the observed actions and in which player 1’s payoff is u1, then
it must be that the zero-sum game (µ,G, I) has a value which is u1, and hence all equilibria
have the same payoffs. This observation completes an analogue of Proposition 3 for zero-sum
games:
Proposition 4 (Two-Player Zero-Sum Counterfactuals).
Consider a two-player zero-sum game in which players’ observed payoffs are (u1,−u1). If
the counterfactual and observed games are the same, then under fixed information, there is
point identification of the players counterfactual payoffs, which must be (u1,−u1). Under
partial information can be replicated under full information simply by “simulating” the noisy signal, so the
effective strategy space is largest under full information. Finally, in the extreme case of full information/no
information, the game is finite so the minimax theorem holds, and the maxmin payoff is player 1’s equilibrium
payoff.
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unrestricted information, then a tight upper bound on player 1’s payoff is given by what is
attained when player 1 has full information and player 2 has no information, and a tight
lower bound is what is attained when player 1 has no information and player 2 has full
information.
Thus, it is a general phenomenon that there are point predictions for local counterfactuals
in two-player zero-sum games under fixed information, although there is generally a fat set
of counterfactual predictions under unrestricted information.
Returning now to the particular example, as z moves away from 1, the range of counter-
factual payoffs expands, before contracting again as we approach the complete information
extremes. Thus, the predictive power of fixed information is large when the counterfactual
is closed to the observed game, and it degrades as the counterfactual environment diverges
from that which generated the data.
The broad economic conclusion is that player 1 prefers moderate z, while player 2 prefers
extreme values.23 Specifically, when information is fixed and |z − 1| > 0.58, then we can
unambiguously say that player 1 is worse off and player 2 is better off in the counterfactual
than in the observed game. When |z − 1| ≤ 0.58, then the change in welfare is ambiguous:
player 1 may be better off or worse off, depending on the true information structure. A
similar statement applies when information is variable, but the conditions for player 1 to
be better off are more stringent, and we can unambiguously sign the change in welfare only
when |z − 1| > 2/3.
8.4 First-Price Auction
Our final example is a private-values first-price auction (cf. Section 5). This setting is
similar to the one initially studied by Syrgkanis et al. (2021), except that we consider coun-
terfactuals with fixed information, whereas they allow unrestricted information that there
23As we discuss further in Section 7, an equivalent interpretation is that if we hold z = 1 fixed and vary
the prior µ, then player 1 prefers large uncertainty about θ (µ (θ) close to 1/2 for both θ) and player 2 prefers
small uncertainty (µ (θ) close to either 0 or 1).
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are two bidders with values in V = {0, 1/9, . . . , 8/9, 1}. We also restrict bids to be in the
value grid, and we also assume that bidders do not bid more than their values. There is no
reserve price in the auction. Bidders learn at least their own value, but may learn more.
We assume that the values are iid uniform, and the econometrician observes either the BCE
that minimizes the auction’s revenue or the BCE that maximizes revenue (both of which
are computed numerically). The counterfactual of interest is revenue as we vary the reserve
price. In particular, does there exist a reserve price under which revenue unambiguously
increases, relative to the observed game without a reserve price?
Let us first consider the case where the observed outcome was the revenue minimizing
BCE. Figure 8 shows how the counterfactual prediction for revenue varies with the reserve
price. In particular, the solid red curves represent maximum and minimum counterfactual
revenue. There are two features to notice: First, even if the reserve price stays at zero, there
is a fat set of counterfactual revenue levels. This indicates that there exist information struc-
tures that could induce the revenue minimizing BCE for which there are multiple equilibria,
and that revenue varies across these equilibria. So, even if the reserve price does not change,
revenue could in principle increase if the bidders coordinated on a different equilibrium. This
multiplicity persists at higher reserve prices. However, for moderate reserve prices, the lower
bound on revenue increases above the observed level. This lower bound is maximized at
5/9. At this reserve price, we can unambiguously say that regardless of the information
and equilibrium, revenue would necessarily be higher than in the observed outcome. Note
that since the lowest value is zero, it is necessarily the case that minimum revenue increases
when the reserve price changes from 0 to 1/9, although it is not obvious that revenue should
continue to increase in the reserve price beyond this point.
Figure 8 also shows how the counterfactual prediction if we allowed information vary, but
held fixed the value distribution. For the lower bound, the predictions are not substantively
different, although the upper bound on revenue is considerably more permissive. This is not
surprising: The simulated data came from the revenue-minimizing information structure, so
52
Figure 8: Counterfactual when observed outcome is the revenue minimizing BCE.
the fact that the lower red and blue curves nearly coincide is a reflection of the fact that the
revenue-minimizing information does not vary significantly with the reserve price.
We next consider the case where the observed outcome is the revenue maximizing BCE.
The corresponding counterfactual prediction is depicted in Figure 9. In this case, adding
a reserve price cannot lead to a significant increase in revenue, and will necessarily cause
revenue to decrease if it the reserve price is sufficiently high. Again, this prediction is
substantively the same as what we would obtain with unrestricted information, although
in this case it is the lower bound on revenue that is more permissive with unrestricted
information. In fact, we can give an analytical justification for both the fact that maximum
revenue is (nearly) decreasing in the reserve price, and also the fact that the fixed- and
unrestricted-information bounds coincide. As discussed in Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris
(2017, Section 5.4), under the hypothesis that bidders do not bid more than their values,
there is an elementary lower bound on bidder surplus, which is the maximum payoff a bidder
could obtain if others were bidding their values. With two bidders whose values are exactly
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uniformly distributed on [0, 1], and when the reserve price is r, the lower bound for a bidder
with value v ≥ r is the maximum of
max
b∈[r,v]




if v ≥ 2r;
(v − r) r if r ≤ v < 2r.
(If v < r, the lower bound on bidder surplus is zero.) The lower bound on ex ante bidder


























r = r − 2r2 + r3.



























if r < 1
2
;
2r2 − r − r3 if 1
2
≤ r ≤ 1.
We have plotted R in green in Figure 9. It is straightforward to verify that this function is
decreasing. Moreover, Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2017) show that the bound is tight
when r = 0, meaning that there exists an information structure and equilibrium in which
revenue is R (0), so that in the limit when the value and bid grids fill in all of [0, 1], maximum
revenue must be decreasing in the reserve price. We conjecture that this construction can
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Figure 9: Counterfactual when observed outcome is the revenue-maximizing BCE.
be generalized to r > 0, so that in fact R (r) is maximum revenue across all BCE. As a final
note, this counterfactual exercise extracts as much from the data as possible about players’
information, as it pertains to this particular counterfactual prediction. We may contrast this
approach with one suggested by us in our analysis of BCE of interdependent value first-price
auctions (Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris, 2017). In that paper, we identified a tight lower
bound on the winning bid distribution across all BCE consistent with a given ex post value
distribution. We suggested using that bound to partially identify the value distributions
that can rationalize observed winning bids. This partially identified set could then be used
to generate counterfactual predictions. Such an exercise would allow information to vary
between the observed and counterfactual auctions. In contrast, the methodology in the
present paper holds information fixed between observation and counterfactual. Our focus is
also less on the identification of values than on the identification of information, although
we could have also treated the value distribution as a latent variable to be identified from
55
the BCE, in which case we would have been using the entire observed bid distribution to
implicitly restrict the value distribution, rather than just the distribution of the winning bid.
8.5 Innocuous Assumptions
Our model imposes a great deal of structure on the environment. In particular, we have
assumed that information is described by a single information structure, utilities are known,
the prior over the state is held fixed, and there is a single equilibrium that is played in the
observed game and a single equilibrium in the counterfactual. At first glance, this structure
seems restrictive for empirical applications in which the data is generated by many different
instances from the observed game, and where conditions may vary from one instance to
another. But, as we will now explain, these assumptions are without loss of generality and
could be relaxed at the expense of a richer model.
1. All players receive signals from the same information structure. In practice, players
with different characteristics, in different locations, or different points in time may
receive qualitatively different forms of information. We may, however, consider these
to be special cases of global description of players’ information, where the heterogeneity
in information is encoded as an extra dimension of signal. For example, suppose that for
each k = 1, . . . , K, a fraction βk ∈ [0, 1] of the data is generated when the players have
common knowledge that the information structure is Ik =
{






equivalently represent this economy with a new information structure in which Si =





k (Y |θ) if X = {k} × Y for some k;
0 otherwise.
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In words, with probability one, all players get signals in the same Sk, and each k
has probability βk. Our counterfactual prediction implicitly allows for information
structures of this form.
2. The utility functions ui (a, θ) are known to the analyst. Uncertainty about preferences
can be incorporated by expanding the state space. For example, suppose we start
with a state space Θ, a moment restriction M = {φ (a, θ)}, and two possible utility
functions u1 and u2. Then we can expand the state space to Θ̃ = {1, 2} × Θ, utility








φ̃ (a, (k, θ)) = φ (a, θ)
}
.
Thus, the prevalence of u1 and u2 in the population is a free variable, and is partially
identified from the data.
3. The distribution over states µ is held fixed in the counterfactual. In fact, we can allow
a different distribution µ̂ in the counterfactual, as long as it is absolutely continuous
with respect to µ, meaning that it can be written as µ̂ (θ) = η (θ)µ (θ) for some
η : Θ → R+. For example, when we are only interested in varying the prior and the
absolute continuity hypothesis is satisfied, then we can set the counterfactual utility






















µ̂ (θ)ui (a, θ)σ (a|s) π (ds|θ) ,
and the represented payoffs are equivalent to those that would obtain with the different
prior. This is merely a reflection of the well-known indeterminacy of probabilities versus
utilities in the subjective expected utility model, when utilities are state dependent
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(Savage, 1954; Anscombe and Aumann, 1963). Indeed, this transformation was being
used in the single-player analysis of Section 4.1, which can be reinterpreted as variations
of the prior.
4. All players play the same equilibria of the observed and counterfactual games. This
is also without loss of generality. Suppose that the information structure is I, and a
share βk of the data is generated from players who play strategies σk for k = 1, . . . , K.
The same outcome can be induced with a single information structure Ĩ, in which S̃i =
{1, . . . , K} × Si, π̃ ({k} ×X|θ) = βkπ (X|θ), and strategies are σ̃i (a| (k, t)) = σki (a|s).
In effect, the first coordinate of the new signal s̃i is a public randomization device
which is equal to k with probability βk. Strategies on the larger space say to play σk
when X = k.
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